MAINE CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS RESOURCES
- 1 Construction Claims
- 2 Construction Damages
- 3 Coverage Trigger of Coverage
Maine’s statute of limitations is six years, commencing when the “cause of action accrues.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 752. With only a few exceptions, there is no discovery rule.
The cause of action begins to run, regardless of whether any injury is discovered, at the time that the wrongful act produced injury. In a breach of contract, negligence or warranty claim alleging a construction defect, the cause of action accrues at the time that the party breached the contract, normally when they perform the task called for in the contract. Dunelawn Owner’s Assoc. v. Gendreau, 750 A.2d 591 (Me. 2000) (statute of limitations on contract, negligence and warranty claims against contractor began to run at time construction contract was completed even though defect was difficult to discover); Johnson v. Dow & Coulombe, Inc., 686 A.2d 1064 (1996) (statute of limitations against surveyor begins to run when surveyor performed survey); See also, Dugan v. Martel, 588 A.2d 744 (Me. 1991); Gile v. Albert, 943 A.2d 599 (Me. 2008).
The theory under this approach is that the owner has the right to sue the contractor for a defect existing at the time the contractor left the job. Therefore, the six-year statute begins to run at that time.
If the claim is for personal injury or damage to other property, the person injured may not have had any contractual relationship with the contractor. Therefore, he would not have had a right to sue until the date of the injury. Therefore, the six year statute of limitations would begin to run on the date of injury. For example, if someone was hurt after falling through a porch stair that was poorly built, the statute begins to run on the date of injury, not the date that the porch stair was built. It is not clear when the statute would begin to run on a personal injury plaintiff when the injured party originally had a contract with the contractor defendant.
In a claim for contribution, when one party has paid a judgment or settled a case and seeks recovery for all or part of it from another party, the statute does not begin to run until the time of the judgment against the party seeking contribution. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 676 A.2d 510 (1996).
Any claim under the Home Construction Contract Act must be brought within two years of the violation. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1490(2).
There are numerous exceptions to the basic statutes of limitation for various circumstances. Among them are death claims, 18-A MRSA § 2-804(b); claims by a minor, 14 MRSA § 853; a defendant who has moved out of state, 14 M.R.S.A. §866; and claims by and against government entities.
There is a special statute of limitations for “architects or engineers duly licensed or registered.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 752-A. The claim shall be commenced “within four years after such malpractice or negligence is discovered, but in no event shall any such action be commenced more than ten years after the substantial completion of a construction contract or the substantial completion of the services provided, if a construction contract is not involved.” In other words, unlike Maine’s general statute of limitations, there is a discovery rule for claims against architects or engineers. In spite of that discovery rule, however, the claim cannot be brought more than ten years after the project.
Maine does not have a statute granting the right to repair and no presuit statutory procedures unique to a construction claim. A homeowner seeking to recover attorneys fees under the Home Construction Contract Act must make a written settlement demand thirty days prior to filing suit as required by the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 5 M.R.S.A. § 213(1-A).
Preventing the other party from performing is a material breach warranting the other party’s termination of the contract. Morin, 615 A.2d 239. In Morin, the Court held that the owner breached the contract when it failed to allow the contractor to repair defective siding. To the extent there is a “right to repair” in Maine, it is based on the decision in Morin.
Defense and indemnity provisions in construction contracts are enforceable. Provisions that require one party to indemnify the other party for the other party’s own fault, however, are not favored and should not be construed in favor of indemnification. To be enforceable, such a provision must clearly and unequivocally state a mutual intention on the part of the parties to provide indemnity for a party even if that party is at fault. If the provision is considered ambiguous, it should be construed against the party seeking indemnification. Lloyd v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 833 A.2d 1, 4 (Me. 2003); McGraw v. S.D. Warren Co. 656 A.2d 1222 (Me.1995); Emery Waterhouse v. Lea, 467 A.2d 896 (Me. 1983).
If there are tort claims, there is a free right of contribution against other tortfeasors. If, however, it is a case where the economic loss doctrine bars any tort claims, then the right to contribution may only exist when the party seeking to recover has a contractual relationship with the other party. The Law Court has held that contribution claims must be between joint tortfeasors. See, Johanson v. Dunnington, 785 A.2d 1244 (Me. 2001). Therefore, one potentially liable party may not be able to bring a contribution or indemnity claim against another potentially liable party unless they have a contractual relationship. That could preclude both a claim by an owner or a subcontractor against another subcontractor or supplier and a claim by a contractor against an architect. There is no Maine law directly on point, but it is the logical outcome of Maine case law.
None in Maine
Maine has adopted the economic loss doctrine. Although there is no Law Court decision specifically applying the doctrine to a construction claim, the case law suggests that the doctrine would bar a negligence claim in the construction context if the only damage was to the work itself. In Oceanside at Pine Point Condominium Owner’s Assoc. v. Peachtree Doors, 659 A.2d 267, 269- 70 (Me. 1995), the Court barred a negligence count against a window manufacturer. The defective windows had caused damage to the Plaintiff’s new construction. Defining the “product” as the end product that the plaintiffs purchased, which was the entire building, as opposed to merely the windows supplied by the Defendant, the Court held that the doctrine barred the owners’ negligence claim. Although the Law Court has not decided any additional cases on the economic loss doctrine, the facts of Oceanside, involving a construction project, are a strong indicator that the Law Court would apply the economic loss doctrine to a claim against a contractor. The Federal Court here in Maine held that Maine law would apply the doctrine both to a service contract and would apply to a failed condenser installed during the construction of a waste management facility. Maine Rubber Int’l v. Env’l Mgt. Group, Inc., 295 F.Supp.2d 125, 128 (D. Me. 2003) corrected by 298 F.Supp.2d 133 (D. Me. 2004); Penobscot Energy Recovery Co. v. Bos-Hatten, Inc., 111 F.Supp.2d 55 (D.Me. 2000).
Although there are the typical licensing requirements for certain trades such as electricians and plumbers, contractors are not required to be licensed in Maine.
Virtually all construction claims start with a breach of contract claim. A contract may be written or oral. Although the lack of a written contract in a residential project may give rise to a claim for the violation of the Home Construction Contract Act, the owner and contractor may still enforce the terms of oral contract. Runnells v. Quinn, 890 A.2d 713 (Me. 2006). Unless oral modification is forbidden in the written contract, contracts may be modified both in writing and orally. A contract that has been induced by fraud is voidable. Barrett v. McDonald Investment, Inc, 870 A.2d 146 (Me. 2005).
Whether there is a breach of contract normally depends on the language of the contract. A party to a contract breaches the contract if they fail to meet “substantial compliance” with the terms of the contract. An owner warrants the sufficiency of the plans and specifications. Paine v. Spottiswoode, 612 A.2d 235 (Me. 1992). Unless the contractor has design responsibility, a contractor cannot be liable if the building is constructed in accordance with the plans and specifications. Associated Builders v. Oczkowski, 801 A.2d 1008 (Me. 2002). All construction contracts contain an implied warranty that the work will be completed in a workmanlike fashion. Paine, 612 A.2d 235 (Me. 1992).
If a contractor is in substantial compliance with the contract, he may recover the full contract price, less any damages for defects. Morin v. Atlantic Design & Construction, 615 A.2d 239 (Me 1992); F.A. Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986). A material breach of the contract, on the other hand, allows the other party to terminate the transaction and refuse performance. A material breach is a nonperformance of a duty that is so material and important as to justify the injured party to regard the transaction as over. Cellar Dwellers, Inc. v. D’Alessio, 993 A.2d 1 (Me. 2010); Advanced Construction Corp. v. Pilecki, 901 A.2d 189 (Me. 2006). Preventing the other party from performing is a material breach warranting the other party’s termination of the contract. Morin, 615 A.2d 239.
If a party, through either words or conduct, manifests an intent not to perform on a contract, then an anticipatory repudiation has occurred and the other party may assume that they will not perform. Wholesale Sand and Gravel v. Decker, 630 A.2d 710 (Me. 1993) (homeowner could argue anticipatory breach had occurred when company removed equipment and never came back in spite of promises to the contrary); Martell Brothers v. Donbury, Inc. 577 A.2d 334 (Me. 1990).
Breach of express warranty
Maine courts will enforce a contractor’s express warranties, which are in addition to the implied warranty of workmanship.
Breach of implied warranty of workmanship
Every construction contract contains a breach of the implied warranty of workmanship. Paine v. Spottiswoode, 612 A.2d 235, (Me.1992). This cause of action is the primary claim in any suit against a contractor. The definition of “workmanlike” is broad and depends on the circumstances. It requires that a building “be constructed in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike manner. The test is one of reasonableness, not perfection. The quality of work should match that done by a worker of average skill and intelligence.” Wimmer v. Downeast Properties, 406 A.2d 88, 93 (Me. 1979). It has to be “in keeping with competent building practices.” Paine, 612 A.2d 235.
A "proper and workmanlike installation" would have to meet code. Parsons v. Beaulieu, 429 A.2d 214 (Me. 1981). A builder is not responsible for a code violation which is part of a design on which the builder was relying. Associated Builders v. Oczkowski, 801 A.2d 1008. In 2010, Maine adopted the Maine Uniform Building and Energy Code which towns with a population of over 4,000 are required to enforce. The Code adopts four ICC codes and four other standards. 10 MRSA § 9721 et seq.; see also, www.maine.gov/dps/bbcs.
Workmanlike construction also has to be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was manifestly designed: "Where a party contracts to build a building for a specified purpose, the law reads into the contract a stipulation that the building shall be erected in a reasonably good and workmanlike manner and when completed shall be reasonably fit for the intended purpose." Gosselin v. Better Homes, Inc., 256 A.2d 629, 639 (Me. 1969). The work must meet this standard "...having regard to the general nature and situation of the projected object and the purpose for which it was manifestly designed." Id. The warranty also applies to the sale of a new house by a builder vendor. Wimmer, 406 A.2d at 92. A builder vendor also sells a new home with an implied warranty of habitability. Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294 (Me. 1979).
There is no Maine law on whether a subsequent owner can bring a breach of implied warranty claim against a contractor under the common law. A subsequent owner of a condominium owner can bring a claim against a declarant for a breach of the statutory warranty of quality for condominium units. 33 M.R.S.A. § 1604-115.
Breach of UCC implied warranties
When the major component of a contract is the construction, installation or repair of a building, the remedies in the Uniform Commercial Code do not apply. The UCC only applies to the sale of “goods.” A construction contract is considered a service contract. See, Bourque, Inc. v. Cronkite, 557 A.2d 193 (Me. 189); Smith v. Urethane Installations, Inc., 492 A.2d 1266 (Me. 1985). There is an exception to this rule for cases that fall under the Home Construction Contract Act. The statute specifically states that the remedies of the Uniform Commercial Code apply. 10 MRSA § 1487(7). There is no case law explaining whether the HCCA’s requirement of this particular language is intended to expand the scope of UCC warranties.
A contractor owes a duty to the owner to exercise reasonable care in the construction of a building. Paine v. Spottiswoode, 612 A.2d 235 (Me. 1992). Unless the negligent breach of that duty results in personal injury or damage to property other than the work itself, however, then the economic loss doctrine may bar the negligence count. The proper remedy is in contract. See section on economic loss doctrine above. Therefore, the negligence cause of action is typically a factor if there has been personal injury or property damage such as a fire or burst pipe.
If there is a negligence count, then a plaintiff’s comparative fault bars the plaintiff’s negligence claim if the plaintiff’s fault exceeds the fault of the builder. 14 M.R.S.A. §156. If the plaintiff’s fault is less than the fault of the builder then the verdict is reduced to take into account the owner’s fault. Id.
Misrepresentation and Fraud
Misrepresentation and fraud often show up as causes of action in construction litigation. They are significant in that they provide a way to obtain judgment against a business owner personally rather than his corporation. In order to prove fraud, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a false representation, of a material fact, with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or false, for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from acting in a reliance upon it, and the plaintiff justifiably relies upon the representation as true and acts upon it to his damage. Drinkwater v. Patten Realty Corp., 563 A.2d 772, 776 (Me. 1989). Fraudulent statements must be specifically alleged in the complaint. M.R.Civ.P. 9(b).
The elements of fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Mariello v. Giguere, 667 A.2d 588 (Me. 1995) (dealer liable for fraud when telling owner he would install double hung windows and only installed single pane sliding windows). Even though a claimant’s reliance must be justifiable, he has no duty to investigate and his own negligence does not bar the claim. Letellier v. Small, 400 A.2d 371, 376 (Me. 1979).
Negligent misrepresentation does not require either the intent or the clear and convincing evidence necessary to prove fraud. In order to prove the tort of negligent misrepresentation,
One who in the course of his business profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transaction, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss cause to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.Chapman v. Rideout, 586 A.2d 828, 830 (Me. 1990). A plaintiff’s own fault is a defense to a negligent misrepresentation claim. Although the issue has been decided in other states and there have been various Maine trial court decisions with different holdings, there is no Maine law whether fraud or negligent misrepresentation claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine.
Unfair Trade Practices Act
Unfair Trade Practices Act allows any person who purchases goods, services, or property primarily for personal family or household purposes to bring a cause of action against a seller for “unfair and deceptive” trade practices. 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, 213(1). A subsequent owner may be able to bring a UTPA action against the original builder. McKinnon v. Honeywell International Inc., 977 A.2d 420, 427 (Me. 2009). An unfair trade practices claim is often brought in home construction defect claims. What is “unfair and deceptive” is not well defined and does not require an intentional act. A mere breach of warranty, however, does not constitute an unfair trade practice. Knowingly recording an inflated mechanic’s lien is an unfair trade practice. Advanced Construction, Inc. v. Pilecki, 901 A.2d 189 (Me. 2006). The Plaintiff must prove a loss of money or property. Van Voorhees v. Dodge, 679 A.2d 1077 (Me. 1996). The loss must be “significant. McKinnon, 970 A.2d at 427. The significance of this cause of action is the availability of attorney’s fees. 5 M.R.S.A. § 213(1-A). Before a plaintiff can make a claim for attorney’s fees, however, they must make a written settlement demand thirty days prior to filing suit. Id.
Home Construction Contract Act
The Maine Home Construction Contract Act contains specific requirements for any home construction contract worth more than $3,000. The requirements include including estimates, dates that the work will be completed, the contract price, specific warranties, a method of dispute resolution, and a requirement for written change order. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1486 et seq. Violation of the Home Construction Contract Act is considered a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act allowing recovery of attorney’s fees. 10 M.R.S.A. § 1490(1). The statute must contain the Maine State Attorney General’s website, www.maine.gov/ag, which is also a source of updated information on what is required by the statute and contains sample contracts. Insulation contractors have additional disclosures that they are required to include in their contract. See, 10 M.R.S.A. § 1481, et seq. Violation of that statute is also a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
To recover damages, including attorneys’ fees, under either the Home Construction Contract Act or the Unfair Trade Practices Act, the statute requires that the Plaintiff shows a “loss of money or property” as a result of the violation of the statute. Van Voorhees, 679 A.2d 1077; Dudley v. Wyler, 647 A.2d 90 (Me. 1994). A mere technical violation of the statute should not give rise to recovery under the statute.
Generally, in Maine, the measure of damages for breach of a construction contract is the difference in value between the product promised and the product delivered. Van Voorhees v. Dodge, 679 A.2d 1077 (Me.1996). That difference may be proven by a change in market value, but is most often proven by the cost to repair the construction defects. Id. If the property has lost value even if repaired, then the owner may recover the cost of repair as well as any remaining difference in value. Marchesseault v. Jackson, 611 A.2d 95 (Me. 1992). On the other hand, if the cost of repair is disproportionate to the change in value or has no reasonable relationship to the change in the value of the property as a result of the defect, then the cost to repair may not be considered a fair measure of damages. See, section on betterment/economic waste below. The amount still owed the contractor is deducted from a damages award. Treadwell v. J.D. Construction Co., 938 A.2d 794 (Me. 2007).
There is no Maine case specifically holding that an owner cannot recover the cost of repair when the repair constitutes either a betterment or economic waste. It makes sense, however, that a repair that is either a betterment over what was contracted for, or comes at a cost that is disproportionate to the benefit is not a fair measure of “the difference in value between the product promised and the promised delivered.” In practice, an argument that a proposed fix constitutes either betterment or economic waste is frequently made. See, Horton and McGehee, Maine Civil Remedies, 247, 260 – 63 (4th ed. 2004). The owner is likely to respond that the contractor’s proposed repair is insufficient. The owner is not obligated to accept a repair that is less than what he bargained for. Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294, 298 (Me. 1979) (owner not required to accept sump pump as a repair to fix leaking basement); Parsons v. Beaulieu, 429 A.2d 214 (Me. 1981) (replacement of septic system was least expensive way to provide homeowner with a working septic system as promised even though it was an upgrade over what was installed).
See above. Diminution in value is in fact the measure of damages with cost of repair the frequent method of proving diminution in value. Loss of value over and above the cost of repair is recoverable. There is no Maine case law whether or not the reputation or stigma of a troubled building is a category of damages. If a building owner overcame the difficult hurdle of proving that there is a change in value as a result of a stigma, without resorting to speculation or conjecture, then Maine courts may allow it.
Punitive damages are difficult to recover in Maine. A plaintiff must prove “malice,” which is defined as deliberate ill will towards the plaintiff or conduct so outrageous that ill will may be implied. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985). It is not enough merely to prove deliberate, gross, wanton or reckless conduct. Boivin v. Jones & Vining, 578 A.2d 187 (Me. 1990). Although sometimes alleged, punitive damages are rarely a factor in a construction case in Maine.
Attorney’s fees are not recoverable unless allowed by contract or by statute. Violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act or the Home Construction Contract Act may allow a homeowner to recover fees. See discussion above. The Prompt Payment statute, which helps contractors or subcontractors bring a claim for payment may allow the “prevailing party” to recover fees when a contractor or subcontractor brings suit for nonpayment. 10 MRSA 1110 – 1118.
There is no joint and several liability that is specific to construction. Generally, under Maine law, joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable. If there are no tort claims, however, then the measure of damages would be governed by the contractual expectations of the parties.
There is no Maine law directly on point. Generally, however, if a repair requires that a cost be incurred gaining access, then that is part of the evidence with respect to the cost of repair.
Generally, consequential damages such as lost income are recoverable if, at the time the contract was formed, they were or should have been reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by both parties as a probable result of a breach. Maine Rubber Int’l. v. Envtl. Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35 (D. Me. 2004). As a rule, emotional distress is not recoverable in a breach of contract action unless the contract is the type of contract that a breach of it will result in a serious emotional disturbance. Marquis v. Farm Family Mutual Insurance Co., 628 A.2d 644, 651 (Me. 1993) (distinguishing insurance contract from contract for the carriage of dead bodies). There is a good argument that a construction contract would not be the type to allow recovery for emotional distress.
If the negligence claim survives the economic loss doctrine, there is no Maine case law holding that a claim for emotional distress is barred because it is brought in the construction contract.
The argument is frequently made that one cannot recover for emotional distress arising merely from the loss of things, but there is no Maine law directly on point.
The Maine Law Court has held that if an intentional act results in unintended consequences, that constitutes an “accident.” Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Ferraiolo Construction Co., 584 A.2d 608 (Me. 1990). Therefore, under typical policy language, it is expected that Maine courts would find that a construction defect is an “occurrence.”
The duty to defend in Maine is very broad. Under Maine’s pleading comparison test, the insurer has a duty to defend if the underlying complaint discloses a “potential or a possibility” for liability within the policy’s coverage. American Policyholder’s Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage C., 373 A.2d 247 (Me. 1977).
There is no Maine law specific to this issue.
Maine has no anti-indemnity statute.
There are not a lot of Maine cases interpreting additional insured provisions, and those that do are dependent on specific policy language, endorsements, or contract language. Decisions on the issues below that have come out interpreting Maine law are as follows.
- Coverage for AI’s own negligence vs. vicarious liability for Named Insured.
- Determining Primary and Non-Contributory vs. Excess Position
- AI carrier’s rights to reimbursement for defense expenses from other, co-primary carriers
A federal decision, Pro Con Inc. v. Interstate Fire and Casualty, 794 F.Supp.2d 242 (D. Me. 2011), raised this issue. The decision was based heavily on the particular language in the relevant policies. Defendant insurance carrier argued that the coverage is limited only the general contractor’s vicarious liability. The Plaintiff general contractor argued that the additional insured endorsement extended broader coverage. The Court held that the language extended coverage to the general contractor for occurrences attributable in part to acts or omissions by both the named insured and the additional insured. Applying Maine’s broad duty to defend, the Court held that the Defendant carrier owed the general contractor a duty to defend. Compare, Boise Cascade Corp. v. Reliance Nat’l Indemnity Co. 129 F.Supp.3d 41 (D. Me. 2001) (additional insured coverage for paper mail limited to claim arising out of negligence of contractor purchasing the coverage).
In Wright Ryan Construction v. AIG Insurance Co. of Canada, 647 F.3d 411 (1st Cir. 2011), the Court held that the insurance carrier for a subcontractor was the primary carrier for the general contractor who had been named as an additional insured on the subcontractor’s policy. The general contractor’s liability carrier was excess. The court held that they had “no doubt” that was the intent of the parties.
There is no Maine law on point in the context of AI insurers seeking apportionment in a construction claim.
An insured being defended by its insurer, when under a reservation of rights, may settle with the plaintiff without the insurer’s consent. Patrons Oxford Ins. Co. v. Harris, 2006 ME 72, 905 A.2d 819. The Law Court held that when the insurer is defending under a reservation of rights, the insured may settle with the plaintiff after notice to – but without the consent of – the insurer, and such a settlement does not forfeit the coverage. (Typically, such a settlement involves a consent judgment against the insured, a covenant by the plaintiff not to pursue the insured’s assets other than insurance, and an assignment to the plaintiff by the insured of his rights against the insurer. The amount of damages may either be stipulated or, as in Harris, determined by the court.) Armed with a judgment against the insured, the plaintiff may then bring a “reach-and-apply” action against the insurer.
Harris further held that in a subsequent reach-and apply or declaratory judgment action, the insurer is free to litigate whether there was insurance coverage for the judgment; and if so, whether the amount of the judgment was reasonable. The carrier may also take the position that the amount of the consent judgment was not fair and reasonable or based on fraud or collusion.
Harris did not address the question, and it is still undecided in Maine, whether an insurer which defends under a reservation of rights thereby forfeits its right to select defense counsel and must pay for counsel of the insured’s choice. At least one Maine Superior Court decision, although not binding, has held that the insurer’s selection of counsel was adequate.
There are no unique coverage defenses in Maine specific to construction cases. Maine will honor the standard “business risk” exclusions in a CGL policy such as the “your work” exclusion. Lyman Morse Boatbuilding Inc. v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 772 F.3d 960 (1st Cir. 2014); Ted Berry Company Inc. v. Excelsior Insurance C., 997 F.Supp.2d 66 (Me. 2014); Baywood Corp. v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Company, 628 A.2d 1029 (Me. 1993); Peerless Insurance Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 384 (Me. 1989).
In a casualty insurance contract, the validity of the contract and the rights and duties created thereby, are to be determined, in the absence of an express effective choice of law by the parties, by the local law of the state which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy, unless with respect to the particular issue involved, some other state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. Baybutt Const. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. 455 A.2d 914 (Me. 1983); Walker v. Unum Life Insurance Co., 530 F.Supp.2d 351, (D.Me. 2008).
There is no Maine case law addressing “Targeted Tenders.”
See section B(iv) above.